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Vildo.Non-technical summary
The model developed in the paper serves as a tool for analysing and stress
testing the ﬁnancial stability of the Estonian banking system by assessing its
openness to credit risk, hence the name The Credit Risk Model. It is used
regularly, twice a year, in the preparation of the Financial Stability Report of
Eesti Pank and also as part of the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP).
As in most countries, credit risk clearly outweighs the other risks in the Es-
tonian banking sector, as banks’ loans to companies and households constitute
about 80% of the sector’s assets. Therefore it is the ability of households and
companies to cope with unexpected negative shocks that largely determines
the sustainability of the whole banking system, while also highlighting banks’
responsibility to create sufﬁcient capital buffers. Shocks that may lead to a
household being unable to fulﬁl its contractual agreements may include the
loss of a job, a fall in salary, a rise in interest rates, and other such events.
Companies may face similar difﬁculties after a substantial drop in demand
for their products and a consequent fall in revenues, and also as a result of
increased loan servicing costs and similar changes.
The inability of households and companies to meet their contractual agree-
ments is quantiﬁed by estimating the probability of them defaulting in each
period. In doing this, the model distinguishes between consumption credit and
mortgage clients. These client groups are believed to react somewhat differ-
ently in ﬁnding ways to service their loans in times of distress, as this paper
also ﬁnds. It holds even if a household has taken both types of credit, and this
is not restricted by the model. The probable reason is that credit holders are
more cautious when handling ﬁnancial obligations related to their residential
property, their home.
The probability of a credit client defaulting, whether a household or a com-
pany, is conditional on the underlying macroeconomic environment, which in
the model is characterized by GDP growth, the unemployment rate, interest
rates and inﬂation. These variables carry information on probable external
negative shocks at the aggregate level. Other factors that inﬂuence the proba-
bility of default are the indebtedness of credit clients and overall credit growth.
Indebtedness shows ﬁnancial deepening and the obligations to income ratio,
an increase in which makes it more difﬁcult to cope with shocks if they occur.
Overall credit growth conveys information on general conditions in the credit
market, showing how easy it is to get access to credit and roll earlier contracts
over if that should be necessary in order to avoid default.
The credit risk model separates the four major banks and the rest of the sec-
2tor, which is a sufﬁcient level of disaggregation, given the high concentration
within the sector, where the total market share of the four biggest is approx-
imately 94%. In order to get a more structured view of the loss provisioning
process and to understand bank-speciﬁc nuances, the model disentangles non-
performing loans, i.e. loans that are more than 60 days past due, and loan loss
provisions for each bank and client group. Losses are provisioned on the basis
of the non-performing loans and the loss given default ratio, which broadly
resembles the coverage of the collateral. Provisioning procedures are highly
discretionary and differ across the banks, and also within a particular bank
from period to period. Therefore the model aims to ﬁnd the average expected
provisions instead of predicting each bank’s provisioning decisions for every
period.
Non-performing loans, on the other hand, are more tightly linked to the
economic environment and less to discretion, and can be explained by the
model with a higher precision. Past due loans are modeled as a dynamic
process, in which the outstanding stock is calculated from its own value in
the previous period, the new additional non-performing loans from the new
defaulted clients, and previously non-performing loans that have started per-
forming again.
The model is suitable for three types of analysis, also discussed in the pa-
per: sensitivity analysis, deterministic and stochastic scenario analysis. Sensi-
tivity analysis assesses each risk factor’s impact in isolation from the others
and gives an insight into which factors are the most inﬂuential. Sensitiv-
ity analysis with the current model shows the high importance of economic
growth and its ﬂuctuations, as a proxy for households’ disposable income and
companies’ revenues. Although interest rates have not been a great source of
unexpected shock, in contrast to the economic growth rate, they are highly
inﬂuential as they affect debt servicing costs in the most direct way. How-
ever, the full impact of changes in the Euribor, the base interest rate in most
contracts, takes about half a year to pass through. This is the time it takes to
re-price all the contracts ﬁxed to the 6-month Euribor.
Inthepaperloanlossprovisionsareconditionedontwoscenariosofmacroe-
conomic development to produce future projections. The two scenarios, Base
and Negative Risk, are taken from the most recent Eesti Pank ofﬁcial forecast,
released in Autumn 2009. Both scenarios expect risks to fall from early 2010
until the end of the forecast horizon at the end of 2011. This is reﬂected in the
steadily falling non-performing loan and provisions rates. The same conclu-
sion can be drawn from the stochastic simulation exercise, which matches the
ofﬁcial forecast scenario-based outcomes fairly well. However, simulations
also show that it takes a long time for the distress to vanish compared to how
quickly it emerged.
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41. Introduction
The beginning of systematic stress testing dates back to the early 1990s,
when banking supervisors and regulators sanctioned it as an important com-
ponent of market risk monitoring (Blaschke et al., 2001). Stress tests are
widely considered to play a central role in ﬁnancial stability monitoring and in
avoiding crises. There are serious consequences to be avoided — research has
shown that output losses resulting from a ﬁnancial crisis are about 9% on aver-
age (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), which is substantially larger than the losses
caused by non-bank crises (Haugh et al., 2009). The latest World Economic
Outlook (2009) reports a historical average loss of 10% but also emphasises
substantial variations between countries, as the middle 50% of crisis episodes
caused losses ranging between  26% and +6%. 1 In this light the importance
of the regular monitoring of risks is more than clear. Thorough risk analysis
may give early warning signals, indicating vulnerability in the ﬁnancial sector,
and encouraging the regulatory body to take precautionary actions to avoid the
crisis. 2
Models for performing stress tests vary greatly between institutions and
the choice of modelling framework is often predetermined by the availability
of data. Individual ﬁnancial institutions operating in the market are closer to
the relevant data and are better able to analyse their own credit risk than is a
supervisory body, and therefore the choice of tools is larger for an individual
institution than for a supervisory agency or a central bank. Nevertheless, it is
important for a supervisory body and/or a central bank to have a tool for eval-
uating potential problems that may occur in severe economic conditions. The
focus in this case is not only on individual banks but on the banking system
as a whole (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000a), ans on top of
this the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000b) sees the role of a
supervisory agency as requiring that banks have an effective system in place
to identify, monitor and control this risk.
A leading role in developing appropriate tools at central banks has been
played by the IMF. In May 1999 the IMF, in co-operation with the World
Bank, instituted the Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) to pro-
mote soundness in the ﬁnancial systems in member countries (Blaschke et al.,
2001). The ultimate goal of the programme is to reduce the number of crises
1In comparison, the European Commission (2009) predicts a  3:7% decline in potential
GDP in the Euro Area and  5:9% in EU8, as a direct result of the latest global ﬁnancial crisis.
2Early warning is an important function of the monitoring and stress testing procedure.
Frydl (1999) shows that the materialised loss depends on the speed with which regulatory
bodies resolve the crisis. The speed of action depends heavily on how quickly the authorities
are warned about possible problems and the proportion of losses that can still be avoided.
5worldwide by investigating the weaknesses of each country’s ﬁnancial system
and suggesting remedial policies (Kalirai and Scheicher, 2002). As a posi-
tive consequence, many authorities have introduced or developed further the
practice of stress testing as a part of the FSAP (Foglia, 2009).
Themodeldevelopedinthepresentpaperconcentratesoncreditrisk, which
is deﬁned by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000b) as the risk
that a bank borrower will fail to meet its contractual obligations as they have
been agreed. Credit risk is by far the most important risk in the Estonian ﬁnan-
cial system as loans constitute about 80% of the Estonian banking sector’s as-
sets. 3 Credit risk models of various types typically use either non-performing
loans (NPL) or loan loss provisions (LLP) as a measure of distress. The frame-
work introduced in the presenr paper is richer in structure and binds both mea-
suresintoasystem. Non-performingloansaregeneratedbythe defaultratesof
companies and households, which in turn are driven by the underlying macro
fundamentals which shape the income of banks’ clients and the costliness of
servicing loans. Loan loss provisions depend on non-performing loans as an
accounting measure, and on the expected loss ratio.
Stress tests carried out with the model include sensitivity and scenario anal-
ysis. Sensitivity analysis provides information on how non-performing loans
and the expected loan losses respond to shifts in one or several underlying
macro indicators such as economic growth or interest rates. Scenario analy-
sis, which is more complex, mimics the consistent movement of all the macro
variables in a particular economic conjuncture. In the present paper two macro
scenario generating strategies are explored. The ﬁrst method takes alternative
scenarios from Eesti Pank’s ofﬁcial forecast from Autumn 2009, while in the
second experiment a vector auto-regression (VAR) model is estimated to pro-
duce stochastic paths of macro fundamentals and ﬁnancial variables.
Both experiments convey the same message: risks will be lower from early
2010 and distress measures should start to decrease from then onwards. Nev-
ertheless, the fall in the NPL and LLP ratios is not as quick as their rise in 2008
and 2009 was. The normalisation process is actually considerably slower and
the pre-crisis levels remain out of reach by the end of the forecast horizon in
December 2011.
The contribution of the present paper to the literature is threefold. Firstly,
it introduces the dynamic equation speciﬁcation of non-performing loans to
extractmissingdataontheprobabilityofdefaultrates. Thisapproachbecomes
useful when no ofﬁcial data on default probabilities exist. Secondly, the model
3The other most common risks are market, interest rate, exchange rate and liquidity risks.
ThesearelesslikelytocausethefailureofaﬁnancialinstitutioninEstonia. However, liquidity
risk increased noticeably in 2008.
6allows new additional non-performing loans and loans that are carried over or
have become performing again to be separated. The same applies to loan loss
provisions. Thirdly, the system of macro indicators, non-performing loans and
loan loss provisions is set up to give a consistent view of two distress measures
than choosing only one of them as common in the literature.
The paper is divided as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the related
literature and the practices in various institutions. Section 3 presents the mod-
elling strategy and the structure of the credit risk model. It gives an overview
of how the initial impulses in the macro variables are ﬁnally transmitted into
loan loss provisions through a chain of processes. Section 4 gives a number of
empirical examples from running the credit risk model and comments on the
test outputs. Section 5 draws conclusions on the paper and gives some ideas
for future work on potential improvements to the current version of the model.
2. Related literature and practices
Thedeﬁnitionsandmeaningsofstresstest, scenarioanalysisandsensitivity
analysis vary in the literature. Throughout this paper the deﬁnitions of the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) are used (Committee on the Global
Financial System, 2001). According to the BIS, stress testing is a generic
term to describe various techniques for exploring the potential vulnerability of
ﬁnancial institutions to exceptional but plausible events. Stress tests can be
either sensitivity tests or scenario analysis.
The sensitivity test is a univariate approach for assessing one risk factor’s
impact on the ﬁnancial data. Analysing one shock in isolation has its advan-
tages and disadvantages. The strengths of the sensitivity analysis are (a) it
conveys important information on the performance of the model itself and (b)
it brings out the most important factors that drive clients into insolvency. The
most crucial drawback of the approach is that it ignores the simultaneity or
interdependence of risk factors.
Scenario analysis is a more complicated way of exploring the risks. It pro-
vides an integrated view of economic fundamentals and ﬁnancial data, as risk
factors are projected to evolve in a consistent manner. Due to its multivariate
nature, scenario analysis is generally believed to be more realistic than sen-
sitivity tests, since in reality all the risk factors interact (van den End et al.,
2006). Literature on this subject distinguishes between two types of scenario:
historical and hypothetical. Historical scenarios draw their ﬁnancial data from
macro episodes that have already occurred, whereas hypothetical analysis tries
to see what happens in circumstances that have never occurred before (Hadad
et al., 2007). Hypothetical scenarios are more ﬂexible because they are not
7restricted in formulating potential events (Blaschke et al., 2001). It may be
difﬁcult to justify a hypothetical scenario without any historical comparison,
but they are realistic in the sense that new shocks may have nothing in com-
mon with what has been experienced in the past. Hypothetical scenario anal-
ysis becomes the only option when structural breaks in the ﬁnancial system
(deregulation, consolidation, change of currency) have annulled the informa-
tion content of past episodes (Quagliariello, 2009). 4
There is a vast wealth of literature on how stress scenarios should be pro-
duced and put into the stress-testing model (see for example Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2009) and Committee on the Global Financial Sys-
tem (2001)). Foglia (2009) provides a comprehensive overview of the prac-
tices of central banks and supervisory authorities. In principle, stress scenarios
can be translated into the macro environment using a structural econometric
model, a VAR model or pure statistical methods. Most of the thirteen in-
stitutions covered by the study used macroeconomic models developed for
monetary policy analysis and forecasting. The strength of this approach is a
coherent prediction of the macro variables, responding to the shocks added to
the model. A concern that may arise is whether the macro econometric model
responds adequately to the shocks imposed, given its structure, and its cover-
age of the variables and the linkages between them. 5 Missing links would
underestimate the severity of a scenario and threats to the ﬁnancial system. In
a similar vein Foglia (2009) raises the issue that linear macro models fail to
produce a consistent relationship between the variables, which may become
nonlinear at times of stress.
VAR or vector error correction models (VECMs) are used if a macro eco-
nomic model is not available or suitable for generating the desired scenarios
(Foglia, 2009). VARs and VECMs are widely used alternatives, appreciated
for their ﬂexibility and relatively low building costs. The drawback of these
models is that they are to a large extent statistical, which means that outcomes
are difﬁcult or sometimes even impossible to interpret. Despite the problems
of explaining the outcome, they still provide coherent shock scenarios.
Depending on the scenario chosen, stress tests can be carried out using ei-
ther top-down or bottom-up principles. Authors are more consistent in deﬁn-
4Matz (2007) summarises that sometimes the term “scenario” is used to indicate the de-
terministic path of the underlying macro variables, while “stress test” is considered to indicate
their probabilistic paths (and therefore also the values for the balance sheet items). In other
cases “stress test” refers to a univariate and “scenario” to a multivariate analysis. According to
the third set of deﬁnitions the term “sensitivity test” is used to distinguish univariate analysis
from the multivariate analysis labelled as “stress test”.
5For example, standard macro models are not particularly good at mimicking oil price
shocks, unless they are specially designed to do so. The comparison of the Euro Area central
banks’ models by Fagan and Morgan (2005) proves that shortcoming.
8ing the top-down approach, which means modelling aggregated ﬁnancial data.
The meaning of the bottom-up method differs somewhat in the literature. Ac-
cording to ˇ Cihák (2007) the bottom-up approach only refers to the level of
disaggregation, as it separates individual portfolios and the analysis can be
done in one centre, such as the central bank or a supervisory agency. Hadad
et al. (2007) also emphasise the separate roles of supervisors and ﬁnancial in-
stitutions in the bottom-up approach, where the supervisory agency deﬁnes the
shocktobeanalysedandcollectstheimpactevaluationscarriedoutbyindivid-
ual institutions, and then aggregates them. Therefore the bottom-up approach
is sometimes also called an aggregate test, in which a central co-ordinator has
an important role (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2000).
Sorge and Virolainen (2006) make a further distinction within the group of
top-down models by splitting them into balance sheet models and value-at-risk
models (VaR). Balance sheet models explore the links between ﬁnancial insti-
tutions’ accounting items such as non-performing loans, loan loss provisions
or write-offs, and the business cycle. These models are relatively simple and
typically linear, using the most relevant macro variables, such as GDP, inﬂa-
tion, and interest rates, to account for variations in the accounting items. The
impact of macro fundamentals either can be explored by direct estimation of
reduced form relationships by applying time series or panel estimation, or can
be drawn from a fully ﬂedged macro model. Sorge and Virolainen (2006) em-
phasise intuitiveness, low computational burden and broader characterisation
as advantages of the balance-sheet models. On the other hand there are also
several drawbacks, including linear relationships that may be too simplistic,
parameter instability, and the lack of feedback effects, and it is also true that
loan loss provisions and non-performing loans could be too noisy as indicators
of credit risk.
VaR models also use multiple macro economic variables to gauge their ef-
fects on ﬁnancial institutions’ portfolios but the emphasis is on probabilistic
outcome. The vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system is captured by a probability
distribution of losses based on a suitable macro scenario. This method avoids
the possible shortcomings of the balance sheet models but has other concerns,
as value-at-risk measures are not additive across portfolios, and so most mod-
els in this strain focus on aggregate portfolios (Sorge and Virolainen, 2006).
The shortcoming may become quite restrictive at times of high risk because
it does not permit analysis of an individual institution’s performance nor the
possible contagion effects.
ˇ Cihák (2007) provides yet another categorisation of models, distinguishing
between loan performance models and default rate models. The ﬁrst class of
models is similar to what was earlier described as balance sheet models, using
non-performing loans, loan loss provisions or default frequencies as distress
9measures, as determined by macroeconomic conditions. These models are not
necessarily related to the top-down approach and vary greatly in their level of
aggregation — some focus on aggregate data, others work at industry level,
but banks can also be separated out if the data is available.
The second class of models are built on client-speciﬁc micro data, which
are explained by macro economic conditions. Macro data can enter the default
rate model directly, or another satellite model could be used ﬁrst to draw a
link between macro data and an individual borrower’s performance character-
istics such as future income. Foglia (2009) argues that default rate models, i.e.
methods that use ﬁnancial data to forecast bankruptcies, may detect possible
problems in loan portfolios sooner than models based on loan classiﬁcation
data such as non-performing loans or loan loss provisions. However, these
models require large datasets that are available only to selected institutions.
Stress tests are most often performed in the spirit of extreme value the-
ory, maximum loss approach (also known as worst case scenario analysis) or
contagion analysis. Extreme value theory, as its name suggests, deals with
extreme events in ﬁnancial markets. Rather than the distribution of all returns,
it concentrates on the distribution of extreme returns, which are considered to
be independent over a long time period (Longin, 1999). The maximum loss
approach ﬁnds the combination of market moves that would cause the greatest
loss to the portfolio (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2000). Con-
tagion analysis quantiﬁes the transmission of one ﬁnancial institution’s failure
to others and the possible impact on the whole ﬁnancial system.
Moretti et al. (2008) give an overview of the different types of stress test
used in the IMF’s FSAP and show that contagion analysis has become more
common over the years. The increased popularity of the method stems from
the tightened linkages between ﬁnancial institutions within each country and
across borders. Alessandri et al. (2009) refer to an unpublished study by
Gai and Kapadia (mimeo, Bank of England) which ﬁnds that the effect of
the greater connectivity of ﬁnancial networks is twofold. Firstly, it enhances
risk sharing and therefore lowers the likelihood of crises. But secondly, if a
crisis does occur, the impact of it would also be more severe. This effect is
reinforced by ﬁnancial innovations and general macroeconomic stability (Gai
et al., 2008).
Regardless of the modelling technique or stress test approach that is ap-
plied, no results represent a ﬁnal truth. Bunn et al. (2005) state that “... no
single model is ever likely to capture fully the diverse channels through which
shocks may affect the ﬁnancial system. Stress testing models will, therefore,
remain a complement to rather than a substitute for, broader macroprudential
analysis of potential threats to ﬁnancial stability.” Any model built on eco-
10nomic data is a simpliﬁcation of reality and unable to take into account all the
complex structures and sources of shocks as they occur in the real world.
3. Structure of the Credit Risk Model
The credit risk model is built for the whole banking sector in Estonia. The
model should give an insight into the ways how economic conditions may af-
fect banks’ clients ability to service their obligations and how this is reﬂected
in banks’ portfolios. The aim is to use simultaneously both the most common
measures of distress, non-performing loans and loan loss provisions, with the
second as a function of the ﬁrst. This is done in order to gain a more compre-
hensive overview of the health of the banks’ portfolios. Concentrating on only
one of these measures would give only partial information whereas in reality
they are interlinked.
Non-performing loans and loan loss provisions are linked by structural
equations on a monthly basis. Modelling both of them together is also mo-
tivated by the fact that in practice it is easier to correlate non-performing loans
with the underlying economic conditions but the main interest lies in the po-
tential losses of the banks (LLPs). The structure of the model does not include
banks’ capital buffers or proﬁts. Losses from credit exposures have to be com-
pared against banks’ capital reserves externally, outside the credit risk model,
in order to establish which set of circumstances may run a bank into insol-
vency.
Four major banks — Danske Bank (d), Nordea (n), SEB (s) and Swedbank
(w) and enter the model individually, while the the others are grouped together
(o). 6 Each bank’s credit portfolio is divided into three sectors. These are
mortgage (h), corporate (f) and consumer credit (c). 7
Non-performing loans, N, are modeled for sector m 2 fc;f;hg of each
bank, b 2 fd;n;o;s;wg. Equation 1 generalises the dynamic process that
generates the outstanding stock of non-performing loans. The ﬁrst component
on the right hand side of the equation stands for the new non-performing loans,
which are drawn from a bank’s exposure, E, at a probability of default rate,
.  stands for the probability of default at the given moment by reﬂecting
6There are 7 subsidiaries and 11 branches operating in Estonia. The current categorisation
is optimal because the 14 smallest banks’ share of the credit market is only about 6%. Further
distinguishing between them would add too little to the analytical power of the model.
7Foglia (2009) emphasises that central banks and/or supervision authorities should con-
centrate on bank level performance rather than an aggregate system-wide portfolio. Aggregate
data may conceal substantial variation at portfolio or bank level, leaving the potential for fail-
ure of individual institutions undiscovered.
11the rate at which previously solvent clients become insolvent. It characterises
new draws from the pool of solvent contracts in contrast to the alternative
deﬁnition, wherePD standsfortheshare ofinsolventcontractsin theportfolio.
In other words, the ﬁrst component measures new additional non-performing
loans that accumulate until they are either written off or the client has become
solvent again. Parameters  and   are used to differentiate banks by allowing
























The second component stands for the “healed” contracts, loans that were
non-performing in the previous period but have become operating again. This
may be due to the client restructuring or reﬁnancing the loan, selling the col-
lateral and paying back the loan or becoming solvent again. 9 In the current
set-up of the model the rate of recycling, , is constant (0  b;m  1). Con-
stancy of  is quite a bold assumption. In principle  could be cycle-sensitive
and affected by the same factors as PD. However, attempts so far at modelling
 as a time dependent variable have not yielded promising results.
The second component is relevant to replicate the decrease in the observed
non-performing loans (occasions when Nt < 0). New non-performing
loans,
 





t k, are always non-negative because   0, E 
0,   0 and    0. In principle, the fall in the non-performing loans could
be due to loans being written-off, M, which stems from the principle that a
non-performing loan is removed from the balance sheet once the bank writes
it off. But equation 1 is shaped to be able to explain improvements in banks’
portfolios even without write-offs, i.e. when M = 0. This is especially plau-
sible in the economic recovery phase, when banks’ clients are more likely to
become solvent again.
Foglia (2009) calls a non-performing loan a “retrospective indicator” of
asset quality, which should be controlled by using lagged values of the prob-
ability of default. This is represented by k in equation 1. The value of k is
related to the deﬁnition of a non-performing loan, i.e. how long the loan has to
8Equation 1 simpliﬁes the process by deﬁning the mass of contracts where the new non-
performing loans can be drawn from as E, which actually contains the already outstanding
non-performing loans. Using E   N would be more correct but is left aside for the sake of
later modiﬁcations of the equation and the ease of interpretation. Parameter estimations would
change only marginally if E   N were used instead of E.
9One aspect related to restructuring of a loan is that technically it becomes operating and
will not show up as a non-performing loan any more, but the quality of the bank’s portfolio
may decrease as a result. Exploring this aspect, however, remains beyond the scope of the
current paper.
12be past due before it is considered non-performing. In this paper loans 60 days
past due are treated as non-performing, which means that in fact the clients be-
came insolvent two months ago and Nt is actually generated by PD at t   2
from Et 2.
Dividing both sides of equation 1 by exposure, Et 2, transforms the left
hand side of it into a non-performing loan ratio (assuming that Nt was in fact
already non-performing two periods before, i.e. at the lag of the denominator).























Equation 2 disentangles PD and the NPL ratio although Blaschke et al.
(2001) show that the NPL ratio itself can be treated as a default frequency
measure. They say that this is true if the assumption of the normal distribution
of individual exposures holds and there is no time variance in the recovery
rate (loss given default, LGD). Further in the paper a time variant recovery
rate is introduced and therefore the concepts of the NPL ratio and PD are kept
different.
Write-offs, M, do not appear in equation 2 because loans have been writ-
ten off only exceptionally in Estonia. With almost zero variation it has no
explanatory power and is therefore left out of the equation. Any reduction in
N can only be attributed to the “recycling” of the loan, supporting the dynamic
set-up of the equation. Error term ! has the property of !b;m  N(0;!b;m)







Since there are no ofﬁcial data available for PD it has been stripped out
from the related data. This is done by estimating equation 2 sector-wise, by
aggregating the data for one sector from all the banks. The probability of
default of a sector m, m, is proxied by a set of macro indicators, X, and the


















b Eb;m respectively. Equation 3
regresses the NPLs directly on macro fundamentals, and the combination of
them generates the PD series because ef(m;X)=(1 + ef(m;X)) = m as im-
posed by the initial equation 1. Note that parameters  and   do not appear
in the equation since it extracts the average PD within the sector across the
13banks. 10 Logistic form is used to keep the proxy of the probability of de-
fault always greater than zero. Another reason for using the logistic form is
to add non-linearity to the system. This is in line with the ﬁnding that the
ﬁnancial system is hit more severely on occasions when shocks are large and
the relevant macro variables are further away from their fundamentals (Foglia,
2009).
The list of macro variables used in different studies is quite long. The core
list includes such variables as GDP growth, real and nominal interest rates,
inﬂation and indebtedness. Hadad et al. (2007) also use money aggregates
M1 and M2 and the stock price index and Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008)
include exchange rate and output gap data. The oil price was found to be a
signiﬁcant risk factor in a study by Simons and Rowles (2009), while Kali-
rai and Scheicher (2002) extend the list by including consumption spending,
employee compensation and new car registrations.
Howard (2009) argues that the choice of variables should be based on stress
scenarios and the types of risks that will be analysed with the model. Scenar-
ios for the developed credit risk model are produced using Eesti Pank’s fore-
cast model, and so the macro indicators used in the function of PD are those
which also appear in the macro model — unemployment, real output growth,
nominal interest rates and inﬂation, the last two are used to calculate the real
interest rate on stock. These coincide with the conventional list of variables
used in similar models, and they also meet the key requirement of economic
plausibility, stressed by Foglia (2009), which states that all predictive variables
must have clear meaning and an interpretable relationship with the dependent
variable.
In the credit risk model cyclical pressures are captured by the unemploy-
ment rate and economic growth. 11 The output gap has been left out of con-
sideration, although Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008) ﬁnd it to be the most
powerful cyclical indicator. Problems may arise with the predictability of the
output gap at stressful times, when potential output may, for various reasons,
shift downwards (as discussed in the introduction). These permanent or tem-
porary structural shifts can only be detected ex post and remain questionable
ex ante, making them a major source of error. The economic growth rate is
therefore considered to be a more reliable indicator of the economic cycle.
10A small exception is allowed in equation 2 when it is used to extract the PD of the
consumption credit sector. The performance of the NPL ratio of the “other banks” differs
greatly from the average for the sector and for that reason other banks’ nonperforming loans








t the set of banks is smaller,
b 2 fd;n;s;wg.
11The correlation between unemployment and economic growth is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, leaving aside multicollinearity issues.
14Both cyclical indicators are normalised to have zero mean and unit varia-
tion. 12 The normalised unemployment rate, ~ ut, is given by (ut   u)=(u)
and normalised output growth, ~ yt, is given by (yt y)=(y), where ( :) denotes
mean value and (:) denotes the standard deviation of a variable. Unemploy-
ment is expected to have a greater impact on households’ PD, as it implies
a sudden stop in the stream of income and leads to households being unable
to service their obligations. Output growth is expected to reﬂect the perfor-
mance of companies more closely by illuminating the ease with which they
can sell their products and get revenues to service their debts. On the other
hand, output growth is a close proxy for households income as well, as it is
highly correlated with disposable income.
Real interest rates have a clear impact on borrowers’ ability to service debt.
However, Evans et al. (2000) claim that their relevance decreases with high
economic growth rates. The real interest rate on the stock of loans, rs, is
deﬁned as the difference between nominal interest rates on stock, is, and the
weighted inﬂation rate: rs
t = is
t   [mt + (1   m)Efg]. Parameter  (0 
  1) shows how much weight the agents put on the current inﬂation rate,
while 1    shows the importance of inﬂation expectations Efg, which are
proxied by the historical mean, . For the PD function the real interest rate is





PD is also considered to be a function of the debt to output ratio in the
sector (indebtedness), em
t = Em
t =YtPt, where Y is real GDP and P is the price
level. Debt ratio is also normalised for the sake of comparison with the other
regressors ~ em
t = (em
t   em)=(em). Indebtedness is added to the equation in
order to account for the increase in monthly obligations (principal and interest
payments) compared to earnings, which makes a client more likely to stop
servicing a loan if an unfavourable shock hits, ceteris paribus.
The last determinant of PD is the normalised annual credit growth, ~ gm
t =
(gm
t   gm)=(gm), where gm
t = 12Em
t =Em
t 12. The argument here is that at
times of rapid credit growth it is easier to get access to reﬁnancing for existing
debts and thus avoid the contracts becoming non-performing. A somewhat
more loosely related reason lies in the correlation of asset price movements
and credit growth. A boom in a credit market increases asset values and allows
further borrowing against the increased value of the collateral. This increased
collateral should enable a client in default to sell an asset and pay back all the
debt, but this becomes problematic at a time when the asset value has fallen
back. Combining all the indicators the function to extract the average PDs of
mortgage and consumption credit clients and of companies becomes:
12The frequency of the originally quarterly GDP growth and unemployment rate data is






1 ~ ut l   
m













where l, o and j denote the time lags which are required for the unemploy-
ment rate, output growth and real interest rate to affect PD. The choice of lags
is based on the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated parameters. Longer
time lags would imply greater savings or other resources which can be used
to service the debt during the period when earnings have fallen or the price of
credit has increased.
The estimation results for equation 3 are presented in Table 1. Unemploy-
ment appears to be a relevant factor in the PD of consumption credit and mort-
gage clients, while it remains unimportant for companies (although it has the
right sign). Economic growth has a greater impact on payment performance of
companies, but also remains a signiﬁcant factor for households. The interest
rate matters most for the mortgage sector. It can be explained by the substan-
tial size of individual loans and high monthly service costs at relatively low
interest rate levels. These mean that any change in the interest rate has a major
impact on clients’ ability to service their loans. The weight of the contempo-
raneous inﬂation rate is zero or close to zero for all the sectors, suggesting that
companies and households rely on the expected inﬂation rate when calculat-
ing the real interest rate. Indebtedness is relevant in all three sectors, and is at
almost the same level. Recycling rates are also very similar, varying between
0.32 and 0.39.
The selection of lags shows that it takes longer for mortgage clients to be
affected by the unfavorable economic conditions. Consumption credit clients
and companies react more quickly in this respect. This is especially pro-
nounced in the case of economic growth, which translates into wage and dis-
posable income growth for consumption credit clients.
Thenumberofobservationsusedtoestimatetheequations(nob=73)isrel-
atively high because monthly data is used instead of quarterly as is most usual.
However, the relationship between the NPL ratio and the selected macro indi-
cators may be inﬂuenced by the lack of a full cycle in the data, as discussed by
Simons and Rowles (2009). The common sample only starts in August 2002
and therefore the macro indicators only capture three quarters of the last cy-
cle. Balance sheet data, on the other hand, covers all the possible states of the
credit market, from the low initial indebtedness of households and companies,
through rapid credit growth hand in hand with the asset price boom, and ﬁnally
up to the collapse of the demand for credit. 13 Having the data from the period
13Considering that indebtedness prior to 2002 was almost negligible, the properties of the
model could not be improved by extending the sample backwards anyway.
16of the credit demand collapse as well somewhat answers the criticism brought
up in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) that models built
on the data of a stable period were not able to pick up severe shocks of the
type that recently occurred, and hence they underestimated the vulnerability
within the ﬁnancial system.
Table 1: Estimation results: Probability of default
Param. Descrption Mortgage Consumption Companies
^ 0 intercept 6.06 5.63 5.63
^ 1 unemployment rate 0.15 0.05 0.07
^ 2 economic growth 0.11 0.14 0.22
^ 3 real interest rate 1.18 0.26 0.53
^ 4 indebtedness 0.58 0.47 0.48
^ 5 credit growth 0.45 0.53 0.57
^  inﬂation weight 0.05 0.00 0.01
^  recycling rate 0.39 0.34 0.32
l lag of unempl. rate 5 4 4
o lag of economic growth 4 0 0
j lag of interest rate 4 3 2
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes: Estimation period: August 2003 – August 2009 (NOB = 73). ,  and  denote
statistical signiﬁcance at levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
All the estimated equations exhibit extremely high ﬁt ratios, which may
look alarming at ﬁrst glance. However, the reason for this lies in the speciﬁca-
tion of the equation, which includes an autoregressive component with great
explanatory power for a fairly persistent process.
Figure 1 depicts the extracted PD rates and NPL ratios in parallel. Con-
sumption credit and mortgage clients share very similar PD rates, which sug-
gests that either the two groups are not different in their characteristics and/or
most households are tied to both types of credit. NPL ratios, on the other
hand, exhibit clear differences, as they are considerably lower for mortgage
clients. Technically, the spread of the NPL ratios originates from the differ-
ent dynamic properties of the NPL equations. This is well in line with the
perception that whereas households are more careful with servicing debts re-
lated to their habitation, it is less problematic for them to have difﬁculties with
consumption credit.
17The corporate sector’s PD was comparable with that of the households,
especially in the beginning of the period. There was some divergence from
mid 2008, when it started to rise faster. Figure 1 also illustrates that PDs differ
from NPL ratios both in magnitude and dynamics, reinforcing the argument
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(b) Non-performing loan rates.
Figure 1: Sectoral break-down of PD and NPL rates.
In the following step the NPL equations are estimated for individual banks
and sectors, employing the structure presented in equation 2 and making use
of the extracted PD series. Summary of the results is presented in Table 2
(individual equations are not shown due to data conﬁdentiality). The table
shows that the results for  equal zero in almost all equations. The positive 
value in one case reﬂects that the NPL ratio was high even when the average
PD in the sector was very low.
Parameter   illustrates quite extensive variations in the client base of the
banks, ranging between 0.22 and 2.84 (with a standard deviation of 0.67 across
the equations). If   < 1 then the clients are less vulnerable to changes in the
macro environment compared to the sector average and if   < 1 the opposite
is true.
18Table 2: Summary of estimation results: Non-performing loans
p
Min. Max. Meany [0;0:01) [0:01;0:05) [0:05;0:1) [0:1;1)
mortgage
^   0.00 0.00 0.00 1 1 0 3
^   0.33 2.19 0.95 5 0 0 0
 0.16 0.34 0.26 4 0 1 0
R2 0.95 0.99 0.98        
consumption credit
^   0.00 0.04 0.01 3 1 0 1
^   0.72 2.84 1.31 4 0 0 1
 0.19 0.79 0.37 5 0 0 0
R2 0.84 0.99 0.95        
corporate credit
^   0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0 1 3
^   0.22 1.17 0.80 5 0 0 0
 0.16 0.41 0.26 5 0 0 0
R2 0.61 0.99 0.89        
Notes: Estimation period: August 2003 – August 2009 (NOB = 73). y — unweighted
mean of the estimated coefﬁcients.  — number of estimated coefﬁcients falling in the
speciﬁed range of statistical signiﬁcance.
Whileitiscommonintheliteraturetofocusoneithernon-performingloans
or loan loss provisions as a measure of distress, the model here combines
the two into one system. The equation for loan loss provisions, consistent
with equation 1, regresses potential losses on the outstanding stock of non-













Equation 5 is a simpliﬁcation of the actual provisioning process. It tries
to ﬁnd the average level of provisioned losses rather than the exact number
period by period because provisioning decisions are discretionary and cannot
be explained with a simple model without knowing a bank’s policy on making
provisions. The expression of the loss given default, e ~ zt, is time variant,
and dependent on the asset prices, proxied by the normalised real estate price
index, ~ z. This is obtained by normalising the ratio of real estate and consump-
tion prices, Z and P C respectively: ~ zt =

Zt=P C
t   (Z=P C)

=(Z=P C). 
is a constant parameter to be estimated and it represents LGD when real estate
19prices equal their average, ~ z = 0. 14 The inclusion of the asset prices enables
the rise in the LGD caused by the decrease in the value of collateral and vice
versa to be mimicked. Parameter  shows the importance of real estate prices
in every equation.
Variable M stands for written-off loans as in equation 1. Having M in both
equations keeps them consistent in that after a loan has been written off, it
no longer appears either in the pool of non-performing loans nor in loan loss
provisions. Nevertheless, M is excluded from the estimated equations because
itsvariationisclosetozero, asstressedbefore. Parameteristhebankspeciﬁc
intercept. It mostly stands for the periods when banks face a very low level
of non-performing loans but still maintain buffers for loan losses that might
occur.
Superscript p is equivalent to m, which was used to identify sectors before.
The only difference is that in addition to the sectors already deﬁned, p also
includes general provisions, Lb;g, that is p 2 fc;f;g;hg. General provisions





t . The estimation results for the loan loss provisions equations
are presented in Table 3.
14Alternatively  could also be derived from the loan-to-value ratio and the age of the loan
instead of econometric estimating, as is done by Coleman et al. (2005). This method cannot
be used here, because it requires micro data from a credit register, which does not exist for
Estonian banks.
20Table 3: Summary of estimation results: Loan loss provisions
p
Min. Max. Meany [0;0:01) [0:01;0:05) [0:05;0:1) [0:1;1)
mortgage
^  0.03 0.17 0.09 4 0 0 0
^  0.03 0.47 0.35 4 0 0 0
^   10 2 0.00 0.59 0.30 2 0 0 0
R2 0.93 0.99 0.97        
consumption credit
^  0.02 0.36 0.21 4 0 0 0
^  0.00 0.41 0.21 4 0 0 1
^   10 2 0.00 0.70 0.35 2 0 0 0
R2 0.84 0.99 0.93        
corporate credit
^  0.03 0.40 0.17 5 0 0 0
^  0.01 1.22 0.52 3 1 0 1
^   10 2 0.20 3.84 2.02 2 0 0 0
R2 0.94 0.99 0.96        
general provisions
^  0.04 0.48 0.20 3 0 0 0
^  0.43 1.10 0.76 3 0 0 0
^   10 2 0.12 1.15 0.64 2 0 0 0
R2 0.93 0.99 0.97        
Notes: Estimation period: August 2003 – August 2009 (NOB = 73). y — unweighted
mean of the estimated coefﬁcients.  — number of estimated coefﬁcients falling in the
speciﬁed range of statistical signiﬁcance.
Estimates of  indicate the relevance of real estate prices in determining the
loss ratio for the banks, as it appears statistically signiﬁcant in most equations.
Estimated  values show that LGD has been 0.16 on average across banks and
sectors (unweighted statistics). Given that general provisions are also drawn
fromthesamepoolofnonperformingloansasspeciﬁcprovisions, theeffective
loss ratio for a bank is higher than the average of the estimated  values. The











t . When real estate prices were at their peak in 2007,
effective LGD varied between 0.12 ... 0.3 across the banks, then the fall of real
estate prices pushed the LGD range up to 0.3 ... 0.7.
214. Uses of the model
The complete credit risk model consists of 142 equations and identities,
all of which are listed in Appendix 1. In addition to equations 2 and 5, the
model also includes identities for adding together non-performing loans and
loan loss provisions across banks and sectors. In calculating the NPL and LLP
ratios out of the sample it is assumed that the growth of each bank’s exposure
in each of the three sectors equals the average predicted credit growth in the
same sector. Credit growth projections are exogenous to the system and they
originate from Eesti Pank’s forecast model. However, these paths are consis-
tentwiththeoverallmacro-economicdevelopmentbecausetheunemployment
rate, GDP growth and inﬂation are also drawn from the ﬁnancial development
within the forecast model.
Sensitivity analysis
The credit risk model allows investigation into how the related macro vari-
ables change credit clients’ payment performance and the health of banks’
portfolios. Each macro indicator’s impact can be explored in isolation to as-
sess its pure effect or it can be looked at in combination with others. Table 4
summarises how the PD, NPL and LLP ratios deviate from their baselines in
response to changes in the macro environment. All the macro indicators are
shocked permanently by increasing/decreasing their values from their base-
lines by one standard deviation and by one percentage point/100 base points
(signs of shocks are deﬁned so that they would increase the measures of dis-
tress). Due to the nonlinearity of the PD function reactions to shocks depend
on the initial baseline values of macro variables — shocks hit the ﬁnancial
system harder the further off the macro variables are from their averages. In
this exercise all macro variables are initially set to equal their historical means.
15
The advantage of deﬁning shocks in standard deviations is that it gives bet-
ter comparability for the resulting reactions. The alternative, deﬁning shock
size in percentage points, makes it intuitively easier to understand the mag-
nitude of reactions. All deviations are presented in percentage points and are
measured 1.5 years after the occurrence of a shock. This is a sufﬁcient time
horizon to let all of the impact to pass through, as macro variables do not affect
15The (IMF, 2002) suggests setting a shock size of two standard deviations, which is more
appropriate for capturing most of the risk — the probability of a two standard deviation shock
is approximately two percent if a normal distribution is assumed. Some studies propose even
larger shocks in order to simulate structural breaks in economic relationships and shocks that
might never have occurred before but are plausible (Chuhan, 2005). Here one standard devia-
tion serves the goal of comparability of responses.
22PD rates instantly but with a considerable time lag; furthermore, interest rates
on the stock of loans adjust to changes in the policy rate sluggishly (as will be
discussed later).
The responses of the average PD, NPL and LLP ratios to the historical
variances of macro indicators highlight the importance of economic growth as
the main factor determining the ability of banks’ credit clients to service their
obligations, ceterisparibus. Unemploymentclearlyremainslessimportant, on
average. Shockingbothofthemby1ppgivesasmallerdifferenceinresponses,
although a shock to output growth still remains twice as damaging even if its
higher volatility is disregarded. The reason for this is straightforward — eco-
nomic activity represents the stream of income for both households and com-
panies, whereas changes in the employment rate only hit households severely.
Changes in the inﬂation rate have no great importance either. This is in
line with the estimation results of equation 3, which showed that short term
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation are not signiﬁcant in the calculation of the real interest
rate but the long term average inﬂation rate is.
Table 4: Reactions to Changes in Macro Indicators (deviation in pp’s.)
variable (shock size) PD NPL ratio LLP ratio
unemployment rate (+(u) / +1pp) 0:05 / 0:02 0:16 / 0:06 0:07 / 0:03
economic growth ( (y) /  1pp) 0:30 / 0:03 1:08 / 0:11 0:55 / 0:06
inﬂation ( () /  1pp) 0:04 / 0:01 0:15 / 0:04 0:01 / 0:00
Euribor (+(i) / +100bp) 0:17 / 0:14 0:53 / 0:46 0:24 / 0:21
combined effect(a) 0:74 / 0:22 2:52 / 0:72 1:08 / 0:31
combined effect(b) 0:74 / 0:22 2:52 / 0:72 2:45 / 0:33
Notes: Standard deviations (u) = 2:65, (y) = 7:71, () = 3:74, (i) = 1:14,
(Z) = 5:27 (based on common sample: January 2002 – June 2009). (a) with no change in
real estate prices, (b) with real estate prices falling by one standard deviation/one percent.
Interestratechangesaremimickedbyshockingthe6-monthEuribor, which
is the base interest rate of the euro-denominated loans and therefore relevant
from the policy perspective. 16 The pricing of new loans is done by setting
a risk premium, #, on top of the Euribor rate, i: im
t = i
t + #m
t . Given this
pricing mechanism, Euribor changes are reﬂected in i instantly.
Mostoftheexistingcontractsarerepricedtwiceayear, meaningacomplete
pass through of Euribor into the interest rate on stock takes about six months.
16About 87% of all loans are euro denominated. The highest share of euro-based loans is
in the mortgage sector at 95%, while in corporate and consumption credit the shares are 88%
and 36% respectively.
23Equation 6 models the movement of the interest rates on stock, is, which in
principleistheweightedaverageofrepricingtheexistingloansandtheinterest



















 in equation 6 reﬂects the proportion of contracts revised each
month. If all the contracts were in euros and repriced after every six months, 

would be 1/6. A parameter value less than that shows that not all the contracts
are related to the euro. 
 can also be less than 1/6 due to contracts with interest
rates ﬁxed for a longer period. These are the reasons why the estimation of
equation 6 shows that 
 is 0.12/0.13 (see Table 5).
Table 5: Estimation results: Interest rates on stock
Mortgage Consumption Firms
^   0.00  0.00  0.00
^ 
 0.13 0.13 0.12
^   10 1  0.35  0.25  0.26
^   10 2 0.34 0.13 0.12
R2 0.99 0.91 0.99
Notes: Estimation period: April 2003 – June 2009 (NOB = 75). ,  and  denote
statistical signiﬁcance at levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Weighting parameter, m
t , is time variant and depends on credit growth,
ln(Em
t ): m
t = [1 + em+mln(Em
t )] 1. At times of faster credit growth
the share of the interest rate from new loans increases and it falls in times of
slower credit growth. Logistic form keeps the share between zero and one, in
the sample  ranges between 0.8 and 0.95 in all sectors.
A rise in the Euribor rate has considerable effect on measures of distress.
In the current set of the macro variables interest rates stand out as the second
most signiﬁcant factor, scaling up to about 2/3 of the effect of output growth
(based on their variation). Furthermore, if the last two recession years were
not included in the sample for calculation of variation, (y) would be only
1/5th of the currently used value and interest rates would stand out as the main
driver of PD.
The ongoing economic downturn is quite exceptional and severe, resulting
from a number of unfavourable developments occuring at the same time: lo-
cal credit boom and bust, falling real estate prices, the global ﬁnancial crisis,
and low foreign demand. These have led to a signiﬁcant fall in the growth
rate, which dropped to almost  16% in the second quarter of 2009. The short
24sample gives a lot of weight to the period of economic recession and therefore
probably overestimates the variation of output growth. Given this, interest
rates should be considered as at least as important source of credit risk as gen-
eral economic activity. If cyclical swings become smaller over the course of
economic development and maturation, a sudden increase in credit costliness
would be more harmful than a sudden fall in economic activity, in contrast to
what was experienced during the last crisis.
One implication emerging from the shock simulation exercise is that re-
sponses to each single shock do not add up together to the combined effect,
caused when all the shocks hit the economy at the same time. The non-linear
PD equation therefore also implies that each determinant is potentially more
vulnerable to changes the further off the other macro indicators are from their
respective means. This sort of interdependence has clear economic logic —
for example, unfavourable or contradictory interest rate shocks are regarded
as more damaging when the economic growth rate is lower, and the opposite
also holds true.
Deterministic scenario analysis
Although it illuminates the individual macroeconomic determinants, sen-
sitivity analysis only gives a partial view of how credit clients are affected
by changes in the economic environment. In the real world all the variables
are interlinked. Shocking only one factor at a time disregards the endogenous
evolution of the others, which may result in the reaction being underestimated.
The same could be true because of the non-linearities built into the system, as
shown in the section above. Consistent paths or scenarios for macro indicators
can be produced in several ways, typically by using a macroeconomic model,
building a stand-alone VAR model of the required macro indicators, or linking
a VAR of macro variables directly to the stress test model.
The advantage of using structural macroeconomic models to create sce-
narios is that they are already built for forecasting and designed to show how
shocks materialise (Quagliariello, 2009). This is one of the key characteristics
that the model has to comply with, in addition to many others, as discussed
by Bårdsen et al. (2006). Their list of relevant model characteristics also
includes aspects such as contagion, default, missing ﬁnancial markets, het-
erogeneous agents, macroeconomic conditions, structural micro-foundations,
empirical tractability, suitability for testing and the inclusion of money, banks,
liquidity and default risk. However, after comparing several classes of models
(RBC, DSGE, DAE and SVAR) Bårdsen et al. (2006) conclude that no single
model can be expected to capture all the risk factors. Building a model with all
the features would be extremely complicated, probably impossible and highly
25inefﬁcient. A suite of models could be used instead.
It is widely recognised that creating a scenario is the most difﬁcult and con-
troversial aspect of stress testing (see for example Blaschke et al. (2001)). The
following example uses Eesti Pank’s ofﬁcial forecast scenarios from Autumn
2009 to deﬁne hypothetical paths for economic development (see Eesti Pank
(2009) for more details). These scenarios are not specially designed to test the
banking sector under stress in the conventional meaning of stress testing, but
nevertheless these are scenarios of severe recession and could be interpreted
as the real economy’s responses to the most adverse shocks that the Estonian
banking sector has ever had to cope with. The strength of using the ofﬁcial
forecasts is that they give a fully consistent and thoroughly elaborated view
of the future outcomes, which in this particular case involve a projection of a
substantial fall in GDP, increased unemployment, deﬂationary pressures and
so forth. As a result of this, the essence of the forecast scenarios is fairly
similar to the traditional stress testing exercise, although it does not explicitly
explore the limits of the banks.
The forecast scenarios under consideration are produced with the upgraded
version of Eesti Pank’s macro-econometric forecast model EMMA (Kattai,
2005), which is subject to expert adjustments in the ofﬁcial forecast proce-
dure. The model does not cover all the necessary characteristics outlined by
Bårdsen et al. (2006) but still meets some important criteria. Firstly, it is used
for forecasting and policy analysis on a regular basis, meaning it has proved
its robustness in practice. Secondly, the model also incorporates such ﬁnan-
cial variables as consumption credit, mortgage loans and corporate credit, and
the interest rates for these loans, and so the predicted macro variables are al-
ready conditioned on ﬁnancial developments and the scenarios generated are
consistent in this respect. Thirdly, default probabilities are not included in the
forecast model but they are directly linked in the credit risk model. There are
also some aspects that are not relevant in Estonia, for example due to the high
ratio of foreign ownership, the interbank market in Estonia is so thin that there
is no need to have heterogeneous agents. 17 In connection with this contagion
is also not of high importance (at the local level).
Figure 2 illustrates how the average PD, NPL and LLP rates perform un-
der the Base and Negative Risk forecast scenarios. The average PD rate falls
in both scenarios, by less when the Negative Risk materialises, as may be ex-
pected. However, PD does not fall to the pre-crisis level even by the end of
the forecast period and even if the more positive scenario is considered. The
factor keeping the average PD rate higher (ceteris paribus) is the increased
indebtedness in the economy.
17Bårdsen et al. (2006) justify the need for heterogeneous agents with the argument that if
all the banks were identical, there would be no incentive for them to trade with each other.
26Non-performing loans and loan loss provisions behave in a similar manner
— mounting PD keeps them at high rates until they peak around the end of
2009, after which the tensions are relieved. Given that the average PD does
not fall to its pre-crisis level, the average NPL and LLP ratios also do not
return to the levels they were at before 2008. Sources of improvement lie in
the recovery of the economy. Although the unemployment rate remains above
its historical average, a rising economic growth rate and increased earnings are
sufﬁcient to reverse climbing PD rates, while at the same time predicted low





























Figure 2: PD, NPL and LLP ratios in the context of the Base and Negative
Risk scenarios.
It is worth noting that according to the model simulation, stabilisation is
considerably slower than the worsening of the ﬁnancial indicators at the emer-
gence of the crisis. This is perfectly in line with the argument that it takes
clients longer to recover from the initial shock because they may have run
down their savings/resources before they became insolvent and their contracts
started to show up as non-performing.
27Stochastic scenario analysis
Structural macroeconometric models are useful tools for providing easily
interpretablescenarios, buttheyarebarelyapplicableforanalysinguncertainty
and producing probabilistic paths for banks’ balance sheet items. This applies
when the credit risk model contains nonlinearities, as like in this paper. In
the presence of nonlinear functions, probabilistic distributions are tradition-
ally obtained by running stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulations (see for exam-
ple Blaschke et al. (2001)). Macroeconomic models are computationally too
demandingtorunnumeroussimulations, thuscomputationallylessdemanding
VAR models are typically used.
In the present paper all the macro variables that would otherwise have been
simulated with the macroeconomic forecast model — GDP growth, inﬂation,
unemployment and the interest rates of the sectors — are compounded into a
VAR(2) model:
Xt = B0 + B1Xt 1 + B2Xt 2 + "t; (7)
where X is a vector of macro variables, B is a matrix of the related co-
efﬁcients and " is a vector of error terms (see the more detailed view of the
VAR model speciﬁcation in Appendix 2 and a table with estimation results in
Appendix 3). Equations 2 and 5 produce error vectors ! and :
t =  +   ((I 
 i)t 2) + ( t 2)t 1 + !t; (8)
Lt = (Zt 2)Nt +  + Tt + t; (9)










with 4141 variance-covariance matrix 
 (see the more detailed presenta-



















28Simulations are executed by picking random draws of Ut+a  N(0;1)
into a 411 vector Ut+a, which is then transformed into a vector of innova-
tions of the macro indicators, the NPL and LLP rates. This transformation
is achieved by scaling the draws to match the variance-covariance structure
of matrix 
 by multiplying the vector of random numbers by the Cholesky
factor A, where 
 = AA0. The result is a vector of correlated innovations,
Qt+a = A0Ut+a, which takes into account correlations between shocks in
macroeconomic factors and ﬁnancial data. Simulated values of Qt+a can then
be used to determine the PD, NPLs and LLPs for every t for the speciﬁed time
horizon ahead. Repeating the procedure in a Monte Carlo routine ﬁnally gives
simulated probabilistic paths for the model’s variables.
A fair criticism of the approach is that the simulation exercise only takes
account of the variance-covariance matrix 
 and sets the remaining sources
of risk to zero (Kupiec, 1998). The threat of an important risk factor being
missed and probable losses underestimated as a result is greater if the risk
factor is uncorrelated with the others. No model is ever going to capture all the
potential risks, however, but the interpretation of the simulation results must
leave some room for some additional, potentially negative shock impacts.
Figure 3 illustrates the outcome of a stochastic simulation exercise. The
model has been run 10,000 times up to the end of 2011 with a new set of ran-
domly drawn innovations each time. Average distributions of PD and loan loss
provisions rates are plotted as they appear at the ends of the years 2009, 2010
and 2011 (the results do not show the uncertainty of the model’s coefﬁcients
but only the effect of the innovations). It has been found in the literature that
aggregation across different institutions may be a source of an additional er-
ror. However the problem is not so pronounced if the harmonised data and the
same modelling methodology has been adopted for all institutions (Blaschke
et al., 2001), like in this paper 18
All the distributions share the same pattern, being skewed to the right as is
generally common to credit risk, meaning larger losses are less likely to occur.
19 The pattern emerging from the exercise is that the distribution of PD shifts
to left in a more distant time horizon. The reason behind this is the recovery
of the economy, predicted by the VAR model, where output growth tends to
drive the dynamics of the other macro variables too (see Appendix 5 for the
impulse responses of the VAR model).
The distributions of the average non-performing loan and loan loss provi-
18The additivity problem becomes an issue when stress test results are carried out by indi-
vidual institutions (banks) and then merged by a central body. It can be avoided by harmoniz-
ing methodologies and scenarios.
19Right-skewed distribution is caused if the majority of elements in the variance-
covariance matrix 
 are positive.
29sion rates also shift to left as a consequence of the lower PD rate. Median
values clearly indicate a substantial fall in the expected distress measures in
the subsequent years, but it is also worth noting that the right hand side tails of
the distribution areas remain stretched out. Skewness increases year by year
and despite the leftward shift of the median, the maximum NPL and LLP ra-
tios remain basically unchanged (for example if 1% probability of occurrence
is considered). The increased skewness and the widening of the distribution






























































































Figure 3: Probabilistic distributions (densities) of the average PD, NPL and
LLP ratios at the end of 2009, 2010 and 2011 (%) and comparative outcomes
for deterministic scenario analysis (B0(:) and R0(:) denote Base and Negative
Risk scenarios respectively).
Figure 3 also depicts the point estimates of all the plotted variables from
the previous exercise, the deterministic scenario analysis. The average PD,
NPL and LLP ratios measured at the ends of 2009, 2010 and 2011 (which
coincides with the period of probabilistic estimates) depending on whether the
30BaseorNegativeRisk scenarioisexpectedtomaterialise, seemtoﬁttheresults
of the stochastic simulation pretty well, as all the point estimates lie in their
respective distribution areas. The Base scenario’s point estimates are closer
to medians of the distributions, making a better comparison with the VAR-
based scenario. This outcome is expected in the sense that the Base scenario is
subject to relatively fewer expert adjustments compared to the Negative Risk
scenario.
The good ﬁt of the distribution medians and the Base scenario point esti-
mates allows the stochastic simulation results to be used to draw something
similar to conﬁdence bands around the ofﬁcial forecast-based outcomes. This
has to be done with caution, of course, because the relationship between the
two is not straightforward. But the beneﬁt of this sort of interpretation is that it
allows to emphasise probabilistic deviations from deterministic paths, which
are clearly and meaningfully explained by the narrative of the forecast (unlike
the VAR-based forecast, which is not easily explainable).
The macro forecast Base scenario predicts that the sudden stop in the out-
put growth in 2009 will be followed by a period of stabilisation in 2010 and by
the recovery of growth in 2011 (Eesti Pank, 2009). This is clearly seen in the
dynamics of the PD, NPL and LLP ratios in Figure 2, which show reliefs in the
distress measures. Risks are reduced not only by the recovery in output growth
but also by the lower unemployment rate against the background of relatively
low interest rates. But what is left out of the picture is that distributional prop-
erties (error margin) change over time. The increases in skewness and the
widening of the distribution areas (see Figure 3) imply that under certain un-
favourable circumstances loan loss provisions may not fall but may remain the
same for the next two years. Although it is highly unlikely in statistical terms,
the deterministic scenario analysis is not able to convey numerical estimates of
these risks. Uncertainty estimates from the stochastic scenario analysis there-
fore suggest that in order to be on the safe side, banks’ capital buffers should
not be signiﬁcantly decreased even if general macroeconomic condition start
to improve. Even if the volume of past due loans becomes less troubling, it
may also be that the restructuring of the loans will mean the banks’ credit port-
folios will be somewhat lower quality and they will remain more vulnerable to
future shocks.
5. Conclusions
Eesti Pank’s credit risk model draws a link between underlying economic
conditions and the health of the banks’ credit portfolios. It is able to separate
the performance of the four major banks in the market and aggregates the rest
31of the sector together (the share of the four biggest banks is about 94%). The
model also splits each banks portfolio into mortgage, consumption and cor-
porate credit. The health of the credit portfolios in the speciﬁed breakdown
are characterised by non-performing loans and loan loss provisions, which are
direct reﬂections of the default probabilities of credit clients. The macro indi-
cators that matter for clients’ payment performance (default probabilities) are
economic growth, the unemployment rate, interest rates, inﬂation, indebted-
ness and credit growth.
Sensitivity tests performed with the model indicate that output growth has
been a leading factor determining the probability of banks’ clients facing difﬁ-
culties in servicing their debts. This holds both for households and companies,
with output acting as a proxy for households’ disposable income and for com-
panies’ revenues. The effect of interest rate movements has remained less
important within the sample. However, the dominance of the income effect
is highly exaggerated by the recent downturn in the national economy, which
has substantially increased the standard deviation of output growth. After the
economy exits the recession, interest rates will probably be at least as impor-
tant source of risk as output growth; with the one important difference that
interest rate movements have a slower impact on distress than do deviations
in output growth. Any shock to the base interest rate, Euribor, or to the risk
premium takes about a year to transmit fully into default probabilities. The
time lag occurs because most loans are repriced only twice a year and clients
are able to absorb shocks for some time.
Scenario analysis based on Eesti Pank’s most recent forecast (released in
Autumn 2009) foresees a relaxation of tensions in the credit market. Default
probabilitiesareexpectedtofallfromearly2010asaresultofmacroeconomic
stabilisationand a returnto growth. Non-performing loansand loanloss provi-
sions are projected to diminish as a result of this. Stochastic scenario analysis,
however, suggests that this improvement should be treated with reasonable
caution, because although it becomes less probable over the course of time, it
is not inconceivable that provisions will remain at their peak level until the end
of the forecast horizon in December 2011 (assuming that they are not written
off before then).
Thelistofpossibleimprovementstothemodelcontainssuggestionsrelated
to the credit risk model itself and to the performance of stress tests. The ﬁrst
category includes several issues concerning the modeling framework. It was
noted in the paper that the constancy of the parameter , the rate at which non-
performing loans become performing again, is very strong and most likely
in reality the parameter varies over time. Therefore additional effort has to
be devoted to exploring possible ways to tie  to economic fundamentals or
directly to the default rate.
32The model could also be improved by the direct inclusion of banks’ prof-
its and their capital. Doing so would enable the capital adequacy ratio to be
monitored directly, not outside the model as is done at the moment.
One possible improvement concerning the execution of stress tests, or more
precisely the macro scenario analysis, would be to introduce feedback from
the credit risk model into the macro model. At the moment the macro model
is only used to generate consistent macro scenarios but has no second round
effects or feedback from the credit risk model. There are linkages in both
directions which should not be discarded, in principle, as this fact has also
been stressed in the literature on the subject.
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36Appendix 1. Equations and identities in the Credit Risk Model
Dependent variable Equation/Identity No.
NPL positions N
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Aggregate NPL ratio RN
t = Nt=Et 1
















Aggregate LL ratio RL
t = Lt=Et 1
Real estate prices Zt = Zt 1 or Zt = ^ Zt 1
Notes: Variables with a hat (^ :) denote series predicted with the macro econometric forecast
model or VAR model.
37Appendix 2. Matrix representation of the VAR model
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38Appendix 3. VAR model estimation results
y  ih ic if u
constant 0.01 6.0  0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.0) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
yt 1 1.57 .16 0.06  0.09 0.06  0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.14) (0.05) (0.04)
yt 2  0.59  0.11  0.05 0.01  0.05  0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.14) (0.05) (0.04)
t 1  0.08 1.13  0.01 0.04 0.07 0.06
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.15) (0.06) (0.05)
t 2 0.11  0.19 0.01  0.03  0.06  0.08
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.15) (0.06) (0.05)
ih
t 1 0.15 0.15 0.98 0.21 0.42  0.15
(0.32) (0.36) (0.09) (0.58) (0.22) (0.18)
ih
t 2  0.28  0.21  0.06  0.58  0.06 0.25
(0.32) (0.36) (0.09) (0.58) (0.22) (0.18)
ic
t 1  0.15  0.01  0.02 0.55 0.04  0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
ic
t 2 0.04 0.06 0.04  0.09 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03)
i
f
t 1  0.23  0.01 0.01 0.45 0.19  0.13
(0.14) (0.15) (0.04) (0.25) (0.09) (0.08)
i
f
t 2 0.36 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.26 0.07
(0.13) (0.14) (0.04) (0.23) (0.08) (0.07)
ut 1  0.04 0.22  0.03 0.24  0.05 1.38
(0.15) (0.17) (0.04) (0.27) (0.10) (0.08)
ut 2 0.10  0.19 0.01  0.40 0.03  0.46
(0.15) (0.17) (0.04) (0.27) (0.10) (0.08)
R2 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.70 0.94 0.99
Notes: Estimation sample: March 1999 – June 2009 (124 obs.). Included variables: y —
econmic growth,  — inﬂation rate, ih — mortgage interest rate, ic — consumption credit
interest rate, if — corporate credit interest rate, u — unemployment rate. Standard errors of
coefﬁcients are presented in parentheses.
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Order of bank and sector speciﬁc variables and coefﬁcients xb;m: xs;h, xw;h,
xd;h, xn;h, xo;h, xs;c, xw;c, xd;c, xn;c, xo;c, xs;f, xw;f, xd;f, xn;f, xo;f. SEB,
Swedbank, Danske, Nordea and the rest of the banks are denoted with s, w, d,
n and o. Consumption credit, mortgage loans and corporate credit are marked
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Order of bank and sector speciﬁc variables and coefﬁcients xb;m: xs;h, xw;h,
xd;h, xn;h, xo;h, xs;c, xw;c, xd;c, xn;c, xo;c, xs;f, xw;f, xd;f, xn;f, xo;f, xs;g, xw;g,
xd;g, xn;g, xo;g. SEB, Swedbank, Danske, Nordea and the rest of the banks
are denoted with s, w, d, n and o. Provisioned consumption credit, mortgage
loans, corporate credit and general provisions are marked with c, h, f and g.






































































































































































































Response of u to u
Notes: Responses to Cholesky 1 S.D. innovations with 2 S.E. bounds. Order of Cholesky
decomposition: economic growth, y; inﬂation rate, ; mortgage interest rate, ih;
consumption credit interest rate, ic; corporate credit interest rate, if and unemployment rate,
u. Standard errors are based on 10000 Monte Carlo simulation repetitions.
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